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systems of thought maintain a radically hierarchical
ontological and axiological structure erected to support
humanity at its apex. In short, Western people have
come to think in terms of isolated individuals and
insulated minds, rather than in terms of One Reality
ontologically interconnecting all things and events.
In recent philosophy, anti-evolutionism is hard to
find. It would seem that Sheets-Johnstone's thesis, that
binary opposition as an ordering principle is refuted by
evolutionary theory, is a moot point. In scientific and
philosophically literate circles, the argument concerning
non-evolutionary biology vs. evolutionary biology
seems about over. With this in mind, what her paper
does not fully provide are some precise ethical
implications for human/nonhuman relations that would
follow from dissolving binary opposition as an ordering
principle of thought. For example, what is the moral
status of nonhumans relative to humans and to the whole
biotic community, given the fact that continuity is a
basic tenet of evolutionary theory? In dissolving binary
opposition, does it follow that we should dissolve any
hierarchy of value among living entities?
In addition to evolutionary theory, process
philosophy has done an exemplary job in dissolving a
number of binary oppositions by maintaining the view
that reality is a socially structured process which
manifests intimate continuities between nonhumans and
humans. Yet, process philosophy maintains a modified
hierarchy of value-experience, arguing that humans, by
virtue of their superior ability to reason, do have a higher
degree of value than nonhumans. It follows that humans
enjoy a higher level of moral status over nonhumans.
But the difference in value between humans and
nonhumans is one of degree, not kind. However, there
may be no value distinction between higher animals
and marginal cases of humanity.
What, exactly, does Sheets-Johnstone espouse as
an alternative metaphysical and moral worldview
based on her rejection of binary opposition as an
ordering principle? If continuity between humans and
nonhumans is to be identified with absolute equality
in moral status, I would have to disagree.
Contrasts that stem from a hierarchical structure
of value need not be invidious per se. The rejection
of binary opposition is an attempt to raise the status
of nonhumans, not lower the status of humans. In
other words, there is nothing inherently mistaken,
nor morally problematic, for humans to exalt and
cherish their species. This becomes morally
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Binary opposition as an ordering principle of thought
has, indeed, been a paradigm for modes of thinking
in Western civilization. Doubtless, evolutionary
biology has been pivotal in the deconstructing of
radical binary oppositions.
The history of non-evolutionary biology goes
beyond the circle of fundamentalist Christian
opponents of evolution. Long before Christianity,
Greek philosophical anthropology assumed an
atomistic worldview, paradigmatically expressed in
Aristotle, sometimes in Plato, and given its modern
character by Descartes. The primary binary opposition
manifest in these thinkers, and more importantly, in
the general ethos of their historical epoch, is the mindbody dualism.
The body is like any other natural entity, to be
understood in atomistic-mechanistic language. The
human soul, as a ghost in the machine, is incorporeal
and spiritual in nature.
Professor Sheets-Johnstone recognizes that this
example of binary opposition gave rise to the situation
wherein human beings are both essentially and morally
segregated from God, animals, nature, and even each
other. This foundational ordering principle established
a justification for human tyranny over other creatures
and the entire natural world. Much of the reign of
tyranny over nature stems from outdated religious,
biological, and metaphysical systems of thought. These
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problematic if this exaltation is celebrated at the
expense of, or in violation of, nonhumans' basic
needs and interests.
Continuity does not imply strict equality. The value
of any creature depends partly upon the effects it can
have upon other creatures. In instrumental value, for
better or worse, nonhumans are significantly less
effective than humans. The key point here from the
moral perspective is that acknowledgment of human
superiority does not imply domination-quite the
contrary. The human ability to apprehend the
interconnections of the ecosystem and the intrinsic
value of all things requires care, responsibility, and
respect for nonhumans. A heightened level of
compassion and respect for nonhumans comes from
the very continuities and commonalities that are
articulated in Sheets-Johnstone's paper.
Process metaphysics, in concert with evolutionary
theory, recognizes that sympathy and compassion are
not merely psychological achievements; they are part
of all lived experience. In addition, there is organic
connectedness between desire and reason, feeling and
self-consciousness, etc. In other words, thinking stems
from sentience but blooms into the awareness of
alternatives. Sentiency is the tie that binds human and
nonhuman life. It is the only defensible boundary for
having needs and interests at all.
The continuity and commonality between humans
and nonhumans established by organic connectedness
should prompt us to see the necessity for ethical ideals
to be undergirded by instinctive and emotional depth.
Before justice and fair treatment is considered, human
beings must feel their commonality with animals.
Animals and humans are coevolved social beings
participating in a single society, wherein all share
feelings such as sympathy, compassion, trust, love, and
so on. Springing from mind-body dualism, another
classic Western binary opposition has been the radical
separation of feeling and reason in moral philosophy,
which, in tum, widens the gulf between humans and
nonhumans. Feeling, compassion, sympathy, and the
like are not bona Jute moral categories, according to
rationalist orientations to ethics. Kantian ethics, for
example, is derived from a mind-body dualism which
leads to an invidious contrast between feeling and
thinking. This dualism has led to truncated visions of
human nature and, ultimately, to truncated moral
philosophies. In short, it is a faulty attempt at human
transcendence of animality.
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However, for all the commonalities and kinship
humans share with nonhumans, there still remains a
hierarchy of value. Over and above plant life, at the
level of animals and humans, there is a higher level
known as consciousness and ultimately, in humans, the
capacity to reason.
Sheets-Johnstone rightly acknowledges that
consciousness and thinking are common to humans and
nonhumans, and are derivative from primitive feelings.
Alfred North Whitehead adds to this by saying:
It must be remembered, however, that emotion
in human experience is not bare emotion. It is
emotion interpreted, integrated, and transformed into higher categories of feeling. But
even so, the emotional appetitive elements in
our conscious experience are those which most
closely resemble the basic elements of all
physical experience.!
By acknowledging that reason stems from sentience,
we delimit human transcendence of animality. However,
it is not clear to me whether Sheets-Johnstone shares
Tom Regan's view that any doctrine of degrees of value
would lead to unjust subjugation of those possessing
less value. Regan's claim is not convincing. It is not
necessarily the case that a doctrine of degrees of value
will lead to exploitation, although this often occurs. And
there must be some grounds for adjudicating conflicts
between humans and nonhumans. If consciousness and
sentiency establish value and moral status for
nonhumans, then it would seem to follow that a higher
degree of sentiency and consciousness (reason) would
establish a higher moral status for humans.
Human beings have achieved a level of consciousness on the evolutionary scale which determines
that reflective experience is more interesting,
influential, and value-laden than the experience of
nonhumans. Humans are able to grasp the universal
nature of ideals and symbols, whereas animal
consciousness is more closely tied to the primitive and
physical mode of experience. Yet, as Susan ArmstrongBuck points out, "... this same capacity of abstraction
from the actual world allows human beings to forget
their rootedness in their bodies and the world, as well
as their kinship with nonhuman life. 111is disconnection
results in the cruel and destructive behavior which
human beings sometimes exhibit."2 According to
Sheets-Johnstone, it is precisely this disconnection
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animals. Art, morality, religion, science, and philosophy
are examples of exclusively human social activities.
Doubtless, nonhumans are remarkably social. But it
would be more accurate to say that nonhumans enjoy
social living rather than cultural living.
The discussion on language perception and
production illuminates striking commonalities between
humans and nonhumans, but there is a difference,
albeit one of degree, and this point is not fully
explicated in Sheets-Johnstone's paper. All higher
animals communicate, but the ability in nonhumans is
significantly limited compared to that effected by human
speech and writing. Most birds sing, but their music,
while beautiful in its relative simplicity, is hardly
comparable to human music in complexity, harmony,
and intensity.
In conclusion, Sheets-Johnstone offers sufficient
evidence for rejecting any lingering appeals to binary
opposition as an ordering principle and to the
axiological schemes that follow. As I mentioned earlier,
what her paper fails to do is to show what specific moral
points follow from evolutionary continuity between
humans and nonhumans. Nevertheless, it would appear
that the careful refutation of any appeal to binary
opposition as an ordering principle in human thought
is an appropriate starting point for extending moral
consideration to nonhuman animals. Human beings
deserve moral consideration and humans, after all, can
never fully transcend their animality.

resulting from radical binary opposition that human
beings must overcome.
We should be more hesitant to celebrate our
unqualified "superiority" over animals, given the moral
atrocities that have resulted from our capacity to
"reason." Recall Mark Twain's remark that the beast is
always clean-minded and innocent, whereas the human
is always foul-minded and guilty. And in a remarkable
passage, Whitehead states:
Without doubt the higher animals entertain
notions, hopes, and fears. And yet they lack
civilization by reason of the deficient
generality of their mental functioning. Their
love, their devotion, their beauty of performance, rightly claim our love and tenderness in
return. Civilization is more than all these; and
in moral worth it can be less than all these. 3
Nevertheless, by maintaining the view that humans
have more inherent value than nonhumans, we can
adjudicate conflicts between humans and animals.
But it does notjustify forcing sentient nonhumans to
suffer unnecessarily. The consensus that human
beings need to reach is when interference with the
lives of nonhumans is necessary, hence, morally
justifiable, and when it is not necessary, hence, morally
impermissible.
At one point in her paper, Sheets-Johnstone claims
that an absolute divide between humans and nonhumans
ignores evidence of culture, mind, thinking, and
reasoning in nonhumans. I suggest that culture and
reasoning are not achievements found in the world of
higher animals. Culture is a human achievement which
springs from surveying the world with a large generality
of understanding. It is the complex of aims and interests
which define and organize human social activity and
its products. Cultural interests involve activities that
are distinct from any activities found in the lives of
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